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Abstract 
Industrial investment in Colonial India was segregated by the export oriented industries, 
such as tea and jute that relied on British firms and the import substituting cotton textile 
industry that was dominated by Indian firms. The literature emphasizes discrimination 
against Indian capital. Instead informational factors played an important role. British 
entrepreneurs knew the export markets and the Indian entrepreneurs were familiar with the 
local markets. The divergent flows of entrepreneurship can be explained by the 
comparative advantage enjoyed by social groups in information and the role of social 
networks in determining entry and creating separate spheres of industrial investment.  
 
 
                                                 
1
  My debt is to V. Bhaskar for many discussions to formalize the arguments in the paper. I thank, Wiji 
Arulampalam, Sacsha Becker and Nick Crafts and for helpful suggestions and  the participants at All UC 
Economic History Meeting at Caltech, ESTER Research Design Course at Evora  and Economic History 
Workshop at Warwick  for comments . I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, for  
support under research grant R000239492.  The errors are mine alone. 
2 
 
Introduction 
Bombay and Calcutta, two metropolitan port cities, experienced very different 
patterns of industrial investment in colonial India. One was the hub of Indian mercantile 
activity and the other the seat of British business. The industries that relied on the export 
market attracted investment from British business groups in the city of Calcutta. Bombay, 
on the other hand, became the centre of the import substituting textile industry. Indian 
cotton traders from different communities moved from trade to production of cotton 
textiles. Few British entrepreneurs were present. On the other hand, British industrial 
interests exercised monopoly control over various industrial activities in Calcutta and the 
hinterland. British firms were set up in tea, jute and coal and here the presence of Indians 
was minimal. Although geographical factors determined the location of these industries, 
who invested and why remain questions of interest. 
The literature on early industrial development of India has emphasized the role 
British investment and entrepreneurship. Some scholars see it as a crucial factor in the 
development of an economy scarce in capital, technology and entrepreneurial skills.
2
 Max 
Weber argued that the negative effect of Hinduism on entrepreneurial spirit was a reason 
for India’s economic backwardness.3 Morris criticized Weber, arguing that Indians did 
become industrial entrepreneurs when conditions were attractive.
4
 Others have emphasized 
the negative impact British rule in circumscribing the sphere of operation for domestic 
capital.
5
 This literature emphasizes the discrimination faced by Indian business and the 
favours received by British entrepreneurs from the colonial state. This led to the absence of 
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Indian interests in Calcutta.  While this may explain the absence of Indian business 
interests in Calcutta, it does not explain their dominant presence in Bombay. British capital 
dominated investment in infrastructure, in particular the railways. The picture appears to be 
quite different when we look at manufacturing industry. The presence of Indian capital in 
cotton textiles industry and the relative absence of British capital in this sector invoke the 
“Lucas question” on why capital didn’t flow from rich to poor countries, where returns 
were high and political uncertainties low.
6
 Only a quarter of British capital went to the 
Empire of which only 30 percent went to the colonies under British rule with India 
receiving two thirds.
7
 These flows to the Empire were in sectors different from those to the 
rest of the world during the period 1865-1914. Davis and Huttenback show that capital 
flows to manufacturing and trade in the Empire were well below the world average, while 
in transport it was higher. India’s share in agricultural and extractive industries and 
transport was higher than the world average, but the largest share went to transport. Sectors 
such as tea, rubber and gold absorbed most of the remainder. 
 This paper offers an explanation of the absence of British investment in some 
sectors and segmented world of industrial investment by British and Indian capital. By 
matching the volumes of investment to the ethnicity of the investors, I argue that 
informational asymmetry can explain why capital did not necessarily flow to activities of 
high return. The role of social networks in long distance trade in history is well researched. 
Less is known about its role in investment.  This paper explores the role of social networks 
in decisions to invest in industry. Investors faced significant risks and problems of moral 
hazard and asymmetric information. Consequently, investment flows were influenced by 
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the extent of knowledge that investors had of particular markets. The information was 
transmitted through community networks creating separate spheres of investment. I argue 
that access to information about markets differed across social groups and gave an 
advantage to specific groups in specific markets. Conditional on the initial advantage, 
information flows within a network further accentuated the segregation of economic 
activity by social group and showed up in the different investment patterns in the cities of 
Calcutta and Bombay. 
 The paper is organized as follows: I start with a discussion of the nature and 
magnitude of industrial investment in colonial India. This is followed by a summary of the 
theoretical literature on long distance capital flows and informational constraints and a 
simple model to analyze the determinants of industrial investment in colonial India. The 
empirical section tests for discrimination in industrial investment and the role of social 
networks in entry into industrial activity.  The final section concludes. 
Capital and Entrepreneurship: The Industrial Divide 
The early development of corporate business was in banking, insurance, transport, and 
tea. The railways attracted most of British investment. Corporate interest in manufacturing 
industry dates back to the mid-19
th
 century. Changes in company law led to the formation of 
limited liability joint stock companies.
8
 In Calcutta the companies were set up by British 
entrepreneurs who could raise capital from markets in Britain as well from British expatriates.  
Firms were floated on the London Stock Exchange as sterling companies or in India as 
rupee companies. The sterling companies raised capital in Britain and traded shares in the 
London stock market. Some sold block shares to British expatriates in India. The rupee 
companies raised capital from Indians as well as British expatriates. These firms were run by 
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managing agents or specialist management firms that owned shares, but were not required to 
have a majority shareholding. These firms managed companies across industries through long 
term agency contracts. Managing agents could be either British or Indian firms, the latter 
typically the Indian counterpart of the British agent. In the context of India’s industrial sector, 
firms are classified as British or India in relation to the managing agent. We can adopt a simple 
criterion to classify all sterling companies as British owned and managed. The picture is less 
clear for rupee companies. Capital was raised in India and did not show up as direct inflow of 
foreign capital. However, the managing agents were the Indian counterpart of the British 
agency firms and acted as an indicator of ownership. This is a reasonable assumption as all 
decisions were undertaken by these agents and the new issue of shares also relied on their 
reputation and social connections. The reputational value of the managing agency houses in 
raising capital in the British and Indian markets was important.
9
 In the tea industry, which was 
the largest sector, most companies were sterling companies, while in jute and coal, the typical 
firm was a rupee company managed by the Indian counterpart of the British agent.The second 
largest sector was cotton. Here the Indian firms were dominant.  
Looking at the ethnicity of the investors, they came from different communities and 
bought shares according to the type of industry and the ethnicity of the managing agent. British 
investors in the Britain invested in Sterling companies registered in London. British investors 
resident in India bought shares in Rupee companies registered in India. While systematic 
quantitative evidence is difficult to come by, case study based evidence from individual 
managing agency houses indicate that British investors accounted for bulk of the investment. 
For the agency house Bird and Company, nearly 90% of the investment in rupee companies in 
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tea and jute came from British investors.
10
 When Davar, a Parsi, floated the first cotton mill in 
1854, fifty leading traders of Bombay paid up the initial capital of Rupees 500,000. Majority of 
the shareholders, were Parsis, the same community as the entrepreneur, but many were from 
other communities, including two Englishmen.
11
 Davar retained a large chunk of the shares, 
Parsis and Gujaratis subscribed one-third.
12
 
This third group of investors were Indian. Until the First World War they invested 
primarily in the cotton textile industry. Qualitative evidence suggests that they channelled 
their investments through community networks. Table 1 presents a summary picture of 
investment in industries in colonial India. Table 2, shows the community divide across the 
two cities Calcutta and Bombay in the first quarter of the 20
th
 century in commercial 
activity including its industrial sub-sector. The racial and regional divide is striking 
suggesting a chasm between the commercial worlds of the two cities.  
 Estimates of Investment 
Chapman’s estimates show that total British investment in Sterling and Rupee 
companies increased from £349 million in 1905-06 to £528 million in 1914-15.
13
 Railways 
accounted for nearly half the capital and tea plantations one-fifth. The value of paid up 
capital of 373 sterling companies operating in India was £78 million in 1911, with 
debentures issued for £45 million. In comparison, the paid up capital of the 2463 
companies registered in India was only £46 million with £6 million debentures.
14
 Table 3 
shows the breakdown of investment in sterling and rupee companies. Tea accounted for the 
largest of sterling investment in 1915.  In jute and coal, investment was primarily in rupees 
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and the magnitudes of investment were much smaller, not only in relation to sterling 
investment in tea, but also in comparison with rupee investment in cotton textiles. The two 
largest sectors of investment in 1915 were tea in Eastern India dominated by British 
companies and cotton textiles in Western India dominated by Indian companies. 
 
Data on paid up capital allows us to track the changes in investment in rupee 
companies from 1880. Paid-up capital is likely to underestimate the total volume of 
investment as enterprises raised loans from banks, particularly British owned firms. Loans 
were obtained from machinery producers as well.
15
 This creates a distortion if some sectors 
have better access to loans. A more serious problem is that paid up capital in older firms 
will have a lower nominal value. Information is not detailed enough to correct for this. 
Therefore investment in sectors with older firms will be underestimated further.   
Figure 1 presents the relative position of different sectors in rupee investment. In 
1880 tea had the largest share. However, by 1900 investment in cotton textiles was higher 
than that in tea and banking and by 1914 cotton textiles was by far the largest sector of 
Rupee investment. In this paper, the focus will be on cotton vs. jute as examples of 
manufacturing investment. Figure 2 shows Bagchi’s estimates of industrial investment after 
1900. Bagchi uses import of machinery as an indicator of investment. This gets rid of the 
biases introduced in the use of paid up capital. Industrial investment increased up to the 
First World War, particularly in jute. The period also saw reinvestment of profits by British 
firms in India and investment in industrial firms by British residents encouraged by the 
stable Rupee- Sterling exchange rate.
16
 After the war investment in cotton textiles 
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measured by the import of industrial machinery grew relatively faster than investment in 
jute and reflected the change in the balance of investment between Calcutta and Bombay.
17
 
The importance of British investment in tea and jute, but not in cotton textiles is another 
reminder of the Lucas question – Why British capital flowed to some sectors and not to 
others. With this as the motivation, I turn to the informational constraints in facing 
investors and entrepreneurs. 
 Informational Constraints and Capital Flows 
 The recent literature on international capital flows provides a valuable backdrop to 
our analysis of the Indian economy in colonial times. Lucas argued that even accounting for 
differences in productivity of labour, the return on capital could be five times higher in India. 
As a net borrower, India would have a strong incentive to appropriate capital investments, 
but this threat was low under colonial rule.
18
 In such cases the low volumes of capital flows 
may be explained if the imperial power exploited its monopoly position and restricted capital 
flows to keep return on capital high. This does not seem to have been the case in British 
India. First of all, as Lucas points out, industry was too small in the economy to influence the 
average wage. Secondly, there is no evidence of taxation or discouragement of capital 
investments. On the contrary, large inflows of capital into railways were encouraged as the 
British government in India guaranteed favourable rates of return.   
 Bovenberg and Gordon set out a model of asymmetric information to explain why 
capital flows do not equalize returns across countries. They consider a situation where 
domestic investors are better informed about the quality of the investment project than 
foreign investors. Foreigners fear being overcharged and hesitate to buy equity. Thus 
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asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors prevents capital from 
flowing to high return economies.
19
 Empirical evidence from recent cross-country equity 
flows support the view that information asymmetries reduce the involvement of foreign 
investors.
20
 Portes et al. estimate a gravity model for capital flows and find the distance 
and speed of information flows, measured by telephone connections, have significant 
effects. The results suggest that local producers have better information about local 
markets and foreign firms are not willing to undertake long distance investment even 
when political risks are minimal. These informational barriers may be reinforced by the 
absence of institutions that are effective in enforcing commercial contracts.
21
   
The return on investment in the Empire has been estimated to be higher than 
investment in domestic securities.
22
 While the average British investor in England would 
have been happy with a rate of return that compared well with the return on investment in 
Britain, Indians sought higher rates of return that was comparable to those obtained in 
alternative activities in India.
23
 Efforts to raise capital for the railways in India had not 
succeeded. But the guaranteed return of 5 per cent was attractive for British middle class 
investors.
24
 Morris suggests that there were differential rates of profit in different activities 
and Indians were drawn to those sectors that yielded a higher rate of return. Traditional 
activities in trade and commerce had high returns. The average rate of return in money 
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lending, internal trade and real estate transactions was 9-10%.
25
  Indian entry into the 
jute industry began only after the jute cartel pushed up profits and suggests that the 
required rate of profit was higher for the Indian entrepreneurs.
26
   
Morris’s argument, if correct would explain why Indians did not invest in the 
industries dominated by the British. They had no incentive to do so, given the higher 
returns to be obtained in cotton textiles.   However, this view still does explain why the 
British failed to be attracted to cotton textiles.  For an explanation based on social 
discrimination to hold there should have been barriers to entry for Indian entrepreneurs in 
the high echelons of British business in Calcutta. There is support for this. Less than 4 
percent of company directors in tea were Indians and there were none in jute in 1911.
27
 
Such barriers operated in one direction against Indian capital and do not explain why 
British capital stayed out of a major industry, despite all the advantages it enjoyed under 
the colonial state.   
A different view of discrimination is that British capital entered those sectors which 
were complementary to their domestic industrial interests.
28
 Jute was an aberration as this 
industry did not rely on the Indian market as cotton textiles did and Dundee did not have 
the same political clout as Lancashire.  This argument is flawed. Indian jute products 
competed in the world market with the industry in Dundee and gained market share. British 
industrial interests were not a homogeneous group. The interest of Lancashire textile 
producers differed from those of the textile machinery producers. In 1843 the British 
Parliament repealed the act prohibiting the sale of machinery abroad. This opened new 
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possibilities for exporters of textile producing equipment in Britain, which they did not 
hesitate to seize. There is much evidence to suggest a close cooperation between Indian 
textile entrepreneurs and the British textile machinery manufacturers. Davar who set up the 
first textile firm in Bombay was advised by Platt Bros from Oldham on the type of 
machinery needed.
29
 In general machinery makers had close contact with the textile 
entrepreneurs. They offered large commissions to promoters of the order of 5% and 
accepted deferred payment.  
 Morris was the first to recognize that familiarity with markets can explain why the 
spheres of investment were different for British and Indian capital.
30
 Informational 
differences gave each social group a different assessment of profitability of a sector. 
Morris argued that Europeans tended to get involved in markets which were export 
oriented or closely supported by the state.
31
  
  The informational constraints faced by investors were different from those faced by 
entrepreneurs. Potential entrepreneurs had information about investment opportunities. 
Potential investors were guided by the risk associated with shares in a foreign company. 
Familiarity with products could overcome this type informational constraint. Reputational 
value of the entrepreneur could also be a factor. Entrepreneurs decided which is a profitable 
enterprise and the investors chose whether to invest in the enterprise. Investors’ choice 
depended on who the entrepreneurs were and the type of industry. 
British investors could invest in sterling or rupee companies. They could choose to 
invest in tea, cotton or jute or utilities such as railways. There were two types of British 
investors: those resident in Britain and those resident in India. The first group invested 
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mainly in railways and public utilities and in tea, while the second invested in rupee 
companies in tea, jute and coal. Britain was the main market for tea, and consumers were 
familiar with the product. In India, it was still a consumption good largely unknown. Tea 
attracted large volumes of sterling investment in London. When the tea companies were 
floated in the 1860s and 1870s, it turned into a mania. On the other hand, jute was 
relatively unknown to the average British consumer and jute companies in Scotland might 
have might have been less risky. Only a handful of jute companies were registered in 
London.  It was a product widely used in India for centuries and most of the capital was 
raised locally. 
The demand for coal came from the British owned railway companies and this 
sector was dominated by British firms. The majority of coal firms were set up and managed 
by British managing agents in India and the investors were British expatriates living in 
India. Jardine Matheson, the managing agent, argued that it was better to issue shares in 
India where there was local knowledge.
32
 The British agents found it relatively easy to 
borrow from the banks in India. 
33
 
The export trade in jute and tea was in the hands of British companies and this gave 
British entrepreneurs an informational advantage. Jute and coal were sold both in local and 
foreign markets, but these sectors remained dominated by British capital until the 1920s.  
About 25% of jute output was sold in the domestic market. This market was well known to 
the Indian traders buying and selling raw jute and jute products
34
, but the local traders were 
reluctant to become entrepreneurs. They had no involvement in the export trade. Demand 
for coal came from sectors that were dominated by British capital. Railways accounted for 
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over 30% of total demand for coal.
35
 The cost of transporting coal from Bengal to other 
region remained high in comparison to the price of imports and Indian industry used 
substantial amounts of imported coal. After 1900, the price of imported coal increased 
making Bengal coal competitive in the home market as well as in the nearby export 
markets.
36
  Indian owned firms that were in the industry were small and produced poorer 
quality coal that was sold in the local market.  
The managing agency system may be seen as an institutional innovation, which 
addressed the problem of informational constraints in long distance investment by 
providing a trustworthy name to the British investor. This system was universally adopted 
by British business in Asia. The reputational value of the managing agent can be seen as an 
important factor attracting investors in another country. If a new firm was unknown to the 
British investor, the managing agent associated with it had a reputation.  
 It was the market for cotton textiles was relatively unknown to the average British 
investor. Cotton textile firms in Lancashire exported to the Indian market, where the 
distribution was in the hands of Indian traders. These traders had knowledge of local 
market in cotton textiles and became entrepreneurs when the opportunity arose. The trade 
in raw cotton had been in the hands of these local merchants in Western India. They made 
large profits in the cotton famine, ready to be invested. The cotton traders came from 
specific communities, such as the Parsis and Bhatias. The community based trading 
networks had in long history in intra-regional as well as Indian Ocean trade. A few British 
firms that entered this industry had also been involved in the cotton trade. 
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In this framework, Informational asymmetries are defined by social groups. 
Information flows were easier within social group and restricted across groups. Therefore if 
members of a social group chose one industry, others could be persuaded to invest in it too. 
Members of a community made similar decisions to diversify from trade to industry in 
response to changing economic conditions of the 19
th
 century. They also made similar 
decisions to migrate. Bhatia and Parsi merchants moved from Surat to Bombay as the city 
began to grow in the 18
th
 century. Marwari traders moved as a group from North –Western 
India in search of new business opportunities.
37
  
A Simple Model of Informational Advantage 
This simple model illustrates the way in which informational flows within a 
community give rise to a herding effect so that different communities specialize in different 
industries. There are two sectors and two communities. First, any initial entrant is a 
pioneer, who observes only imperfectly which niche is profitable. The pioneer has the 
option to enter either industry and select a niche. However, in compensation, such an 
entrant earns monopoly profits initially. Second, entrants from the same community 
become informed about the profitability of a niche once successful entry takes place. By 
entering the same industry, they face reduced risk, and this offsets the congestion arising 
from additional entry. On the other hand, entrants from a different community suffer from 
competition and the congestion and have no informational benefits. This produces a 
tendency towards segregation, with different communities specializing in distinct 
industries.  
Assume for simplicity that there are two industries, A and B 
 In each industry, there are several niches , indexed by  i ∈ 1,2,..,n} 
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 Only one of these niches is profitable, and each of them has equal prior probability. 
 Let L be the loss suffered by entering an unprofitable niche. Let Gi  be the gain from 
entering a profitable niche in industry i, i∈{A,B}.  
We assume that Gi  is a random variable that is independently and identically distributed 
according to density f on [G ,Ĝ]. 
 At each date t, individual  has an investment opportunity, and can invest either in industry 
A or B, and must also choose a niche to enter in either industry.  
He observes GA and GB, and also observes signals SA and SB, where Si ∈{1,2,...,n} is a 
signal of which niche is profitable.  Si equals the profitable niche with probability p>(1/n), 
and with probability ((1-p)/(n-1) i t equals one of the other niches.  
Thus the posterior probability of success of a niche for which a favourable signal is 
obtained is p, and the expected profit from entry (without any additional information), is 
pGi+(1-p)L-c,   
where c is the cost of capital. 
38
 Let G denote the break -even level of profit where the 
above expression equals zero. Assume that there are no sunk costs. Thus an individual 
without any additional information will enter if and only if Gi≥ Ĝ  
Once he enters, he finds out whether the niche is actually profitable or not. If it is 
profitable, he continues in the industry, and if it is unprofitable, he exits at the end of the 
period. 
 Now consider any individual who follows the first entry. We assume that such an 
individual either belongs to the same community, C, as the first entrant, or to a different 
community, Ĉ.  If he belongs to the same community, he  observes the niche that the first 
entrant chose. He also observes an exit decision  and learns if the first entrant’s choice was 
the right one.  Thus, he now believes that the probability that this niche is profitable is 1 
rather than p.  As in the models of herd behavior ,
39
 the follower will ignore his own 
information and the signal he observes and follow the first entrant. However, he has to 
share profits with the current incumbent , and his payoff is Gi(2)<Gi.  
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More generally, let Gi(m) denote the profits when m firms are already in the market, which 
is assumed to be decreasing in m. Thus for any value of t Gi, here exists m∗ Gi such that at 
most m∗ firms can profitably enter. Note that this value of m∗ assumes that firms perfectly 
know which niche is profitable. 
Notice that a following entrant of the same community also learns that the niche is not 
profitable if the first entrant exits after one period. If the follower observes a positive signal 
for a different niche, he assigns a higher probability p1 > p .
40
 
Consider now an individual who is from, Ĉ, a different community from that of the first 
entrant into industry i, and all previous entrants into the industry i. 
Suppose that there are m entrants into this industry. Since he cannot observe the niche, his 
expected profit is 
 p Gi (m)+(1-p)L-c,  
which is strictly less than the payoff of the first entrant. On the other hand, if no firm has 
entered industry  j, his payoff from entering industry j is given by 
 pGj+(1-p)L-c.  
 Thus if Gj>Gi(m) and Gj}≥Ĝ, he will prefer to enter industry j rather than i. In other 
words, an entrant from a different community Ĉ will prefer to enter a new industry as there 
is less competition from the existing firms and he does not have the same informational 
advantage as the members of the community C. 
 Let us consider industry dynamics under the assumption that GA≃GB,  that is profitability 
levels are close to each other in the two industries.  
Let us assume that at each date, there are two possible entrants, one from each community. 
Thus at date 1, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the two entrants will choose different 
industries. If one chooses industry A, the other will prefer industry B since monopoly 
profits in B will be greater than duopoly profits in A.  
Now suppose that both entrants are successful. Then at date 2, each entrant has a choice 
between Gi(2) with probability p (if he chooses the industry of a different community) or 
Gj(2) with probablity one.  
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Thus if he enters, he will choose the industry chosen by his community predecessor. This 
argument iterates -- at any date that an entrant enters, he will choose the industry chosen by 
the predecessors in his community. 
 Of course, it is possible that one of the initial entrants, say from community Ĉ in industry 
B, chooses a wrong niche as he gets the wrong signal while the entrant from community C 
chooses the right niche.  In this case, he will choose to exit, and the succeeding entrants 
from community  Ĉ  will not have full information on the profitability of the niche, whereas  
following entrants from community C will be fully informed about  the profitable niche in 
industry A.  
It is an equilibrium for  the informed individual to choose industry A, earning GA(2)-c, 
while the uninformed individual chooses a niche in industry B, earning 
pG
B
+(1-p)L-c.   
Thus, even in this case, the pattern of industry specialization by different communities is 
sustained. 
To summarize, the model incorporates the advantage of  information flow through the 
community network in reducing risk for a member of the same  social group and offsetting 
the congestion arising from additional entry. A member of the other social group face 
adverse effects competition and congestion without the benefit of better information. This 
produces a tendency towards segregation with different social groups specializing in 
different industries. Even unsuccessful entry by a member of the same community is 
informative as it narrows down the set of profitable niches and the entrants face reduced 
risk. 
This model is ex ante symmetric so that each social group is equally likely to enter either 
industry. In reality, the British had better information about the export markets in tea and 
jute, while the Indians had better knowledge of the domestic market in cotton textiles. This 
implies that the quality of signal, that is the value of  p in the model would depend on the 
identity of the entrant.  It is larger for the British in the export industries and larger for the 
18 
 
Indian in the import substituting industries. Therefore ex ante the British were more likely 
to be the pioneer in the  export industry and Indians in cotton textiles.  The model implies 
that the herding effect would lead to persistence even if profitability was different in the 
two industries.  To the extent the quality of the signal depended on prior knowledge of 
markets, there may be examples which run contrary to the simple model outlined, such as 
the presence of a few British firms in cotton textiles. Note that these entrepreneurs were 
also involved in the domestic cotton trade and therefore would have a higher p than a 
British firm not involved in cotton trade. 
The model also assumes that the profitability of the industries is stationary over 
time and varies only with the number of entrants. This is a simplification and the model can 
be extended to allow for the profit opportunities to change over time across industries. It 
can be modeled by assuming that Gi (m) is determined by a Markov process, where at any 
date, profits could increase or decrease stochastically so that it may become unprofitable 
for a new follower to invest in the industry chosen by a member of his social group even if 
perfectly informed. He may prefer to invest in the other industry even if he is less 
informed. Similarly rising profitability of an industry may induce members of the other 
community to enter even in the absence of full information. An example is the entry of 
Indian traders in the jute industry when profits rose during the first world war.  Entry of 
one firm generated further entry. 
Measuring constraints  
 The empirical strategy adopted in this paper is to rule out explanations that suggest 
barriers to entry. If discrimination against Indian capital or the privileges enjoyed by British 
19 
 
capital explain the different spheres investment, then we should be able to measure economic 
attributes that differ across industries 
 Did the minimum efficient scale differ across sectors?  If the Indian entrepreneurs had 
a disadvantage in raising capital through the stock market or had limited access to credit from 
the formal British owned banking sector, they would be more likely to enter industries where 
the initial capital outlay was lower. If scale economies did not matter then, in any given 
industry, firms started by Indians would tend to be smaller.  I can test both propositions using 
firm- level data. 
Table 4 presents comparative start-up capital outlays required in different industries 
using both aggregate data from Rungta and firm–level information from various sources.41 
It shows that the average paid up capital  in cotton mills was lower compared to the paid up 
capital of an average jute mill  right from the 1880s to 1910. However, this is not the case 
for the average coal or tea firm. The absence of Indians in these sectors indicates a 
relatively minor role of a capital constraint. Table 5 focuses on the two comparable 
industries cotton and jute and provides measures of machinery used and employment. 
Although the machinery employed is not directly comparable across the two sectors, the 
loom is the main equipment for weaving. Unlike jute, many cotton firms produced a large 
quantity of yarn as the finished product. Therefore cotton firms list the number of spindles 
and looms. I construct a measure of loom equivalent by aggregating spindles and looms in 
the cotton industry. (See table for the details) Although the loom equivalent is higher for 
cotton mills, jute firms employed significantly more labour.   This seeming anomaly is due 
                                                 
41
Morris suggests that initial investment in jute was about the same if not lower than the setting up cost in an 
average cotton mill and could not have deterred entry. Morris uses Rungta’s estimates paid- up capital of Rs 
933,000 in 1881 and Rs 1.5 million in 1901 in an average jute mill.
 
  However Rungta’s data on cotton 
textiles show that the average paid- up capital in cotton mills was less than Rs 900,000 in both years. 
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to the aggregation problem. About two hundred spindles could be operated by one worker 
whereas one worker attended to one loom. Both capital outlay and number of workers were 
higher in the jute firm. This could have given Indian entrants a disadvantage if they were 
capital constrained.  However, it has already been noted that such an argument cannot be 
used to explain the absence of Indian entrepreneurs in tea and coal. 
The second test for the presence of a capital constraint is to see if there is difference 
in size between British and Indian firms, in industries where they co-exist. If capital 
constraint was systematically greater for the Indians, we might expect Indian firms to be 
smaller than British firms. I compare firms within the industries: cotton and jute. Note that 
Indians were the majority group in cotton, but a minority in jute the opposite holds for the 
jute industry. This procedure has the advantage that we can use a physical measure of 
capital, the loom equivalent, rather than a value measure, since we only make intra industry 
comparisons.
 
On the basis of the measure of loom equivalent and looms, we can make 
comparisons  across firms according to ownership for the year 1924.
42
  Table 6  shows that 
in each industry, the majority group has the larger firm, although this difference is not 
statistically significant. In the cotton textile industry in Bombay, the Indian firms on 
average were larger than British firms, while in the jute industry, British firms were larger. 
Thus the initial hypothesis, that Indians were uniformly more capital constrained, is not 
borne out. Instead it appears that the minority group may face more difficulty in raising 
capital.  If capital had been a constraint for Indian firms, then British firms would tend to 
be larger in all sectors.  
                                                 
42
I have chosen the year 1924 as there was a significant group of Indian firms in the jute industry by this 
period. 
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I compute the capital- labour ratio intensities in mills run by different communities 
in the cotton textiles in Bombay to test for systematic differences. The only group which 
had a higher capital- labour ratio is the Sassoon group, reputed to be most efficient in the 
industry. The ratio was similar across all other groups and the British firms were not more 
capital intensive. (See table 7)  
Although Indian entrepreneurs might have been rationed out of the formal  banking 
sector, they could raise capital through the indigenous networks. The initial start- up capital 
came from profits made in trade. Entrepreneurs in cotton textiles typically had made money in 
trade as did Indian entrepreneurs in jute. The rupee companies formed by the Indians raised 
finance through local networks. The profits made by the cotton traders during the cotton 
famine of the 1860s created an advantage. The capital to set up the first cotton mills was raised 
by the Parsi entrepreneurs from their own resources and contribution from family and friends. 
The Bhatia merchants, who were the first Hindu entrepreneurs, also raised their own finances
43
  
70-80% of the authorized capital was paid up soon after the firm was set up. Small firms 
tended to sell a small number of high value shares and large firms tended to float shares of low 
face- value that could be taken up by a larger number of investors.
44
 Although Davar had failed 
to find the financial support in three years earlier, by 1854 raising capital for a cotton mill in 
Bombay did not prove difficult. Oriental mills sold 500 high value shares of Rupees 2500 each, 
but had to limit subscription to four share per person due to the high demand.
45
 On the other 
hand British firms found it more difficult to raise capital in the Bombay region. Greaves, 
Cotton & Company, the largest European managing agent controlling seven spinning mills was 
                                                 
43
 Rutnagar, Bombay Industries, p46 
44
 Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, pp59-60. 
45
 Morris, Growth of large scale industries, p575. 
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unable to raise capital to diversify into weaving .
46
 European capital was no more than 10-20% 
of total capital invested in cotton. In Calcutta, the average jute or tea firm did not have 
problems in mobilizing capital. The capital for the rupee companies came from British civil 
servants, army personnel and traders. 
 Another constraint that could have deterred entry of Indian entrepreneurs is the rate of 
profit.  Did profit rate differ across industries?  If the Indians were guided by higher returns 
and were capital constrained, then the profit rates should have been higher in cotton textiles 
although there are no obvious reasons why British firms were not attracted by higher profits. 
Existing estimates suggest an average rate of profit of 9 percent in jute and 10 percent in 
cotton. 
47
Table 8 shows the profit rates and dividend rate across sectors using firm level data.  
There were no systematic differences in profits across export and import substituting sectors. 
Cotton and jute showed comparable mean profit rates, while tea had a higher return. Coal 
shows a much lower profit rate with the median firm making no profit. Higher dividends were 
paid in tea, but comparable rates were paid in jute and cotton. If lower median profit rate 
discouraged British business in cotton, this was clearly not the case in coal. This is no evidence 
that Indian entrepreneurs were drawn to industries with particularly high rates of return or that 
capital constraint alone determined the industrial divide between British and Indian capital   
 Social Network Effect 
The role of social networks in economic activity in Sub- Saharan Africa has been 
highlighted by Fafchamps when information about the market is limited and involves 
search costs.
48
 Evidence from traders in Madagascar finds that family ties were important 
                                                 
46
 Morris, Growth of large scale industry, p579. 
47
 Morris, Growth of large scale industry, p572 
48
Fafchamps,  Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp16-17 
23 
 
in starting businesses, but less important in the long run.
49
  In contemporary India, the 
effect of social network in entry has been explored in the context of the diamond industry. 
The study finds that the entry of a few members of a community in the diamond trade led 
to further entry from the same community which had few outside options.
50
 In 19
th
 century 
India too community ties were important in decisions to enter into industrial activity. These 
caste boundaries were clearly defined. Caste and community networks had been important 
in Indian Ocean trade in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
51
 These same ties formed the basis of 
industrial investment.  Given the non- formal structure of dissemination of information 
about markets, the community was a relatively costless way to acquire information about 
new markets and opportunities. There were broadly five social networks in industry 
Bombay:  Parsis, Hindus, Muslims, Jews and Europeans. The Hindu community was 
represented by specific trading castes, such as the Bhatias.  
 Parsis were the first social group to become industrial entrepreneurs. A close knit 
community, they made their wealth from opium and cotton trade. They were also one of the 
first groups to embrace western education. As a community, the Parsis had fewer barriers 
to interacting with other groups and on foreign travel, which gave them greater contact with 
western society. The high level of human capital in the Parsi community gave them an 
advantage in industry.
52
  Tripathi argues that the exposure to new ideas and values and a 
desire to learn western industrial practices was common to the pioneers from different 
communities.
53
  The first Hindu textile entrepreneur, Khatau Makanji, belonged to a small 
                                                 
49
 Fafchamps and Minten , Relationships and traders in Madagascar. 
50
 Munshi, Strength in Numbers. 
51
 Ray, Asian capital in the age of European domination.  
52
 White, Competition and Collaboration: Parsi Merchants and the English East India Company, Desai, 
Origins of Parsi Enterprise,  Bagchi, The Private Investment in India. 
53
Tripathi, Historical Roots of Entrepreneurship, p108. 
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group of progressive Bhatia merchants and had links with Parsi merchants, which 
broadened their outlook
54
 The Bhatias came from Gujarat and traded in raw cotton, textiles 
and grain. The community played an important role in the religious reform movement of 
the 1870s. Mulji Thackersey, one of the leaders visited England and admired Western 
industrial values. Guha sees the success of the Parsis and Gujarati communities in Bombay 
as a consequence of the less imposing presence of the British in the commercial sector 
rather than religion and Western education
55
 
The move to set up cotton mills came from members of a social groups involved in 
trade and others from the group followed. In the case of another pioneer Ranchhodlal who 
belonged to a community with little involvement in trade, entry into the cotton textile 
industry had a different outcome.  Other social groups in his city with links to cotton trade 
did not follow. The Jains, who were cotton traders, refused to get involved when 
Ranchhodlal approached them for funds. It took them and their traditional rivals, the 
Vaishnava Banias another couple of decades to move into this industry.
56
 The success of 
the firms run by the Parsis had little impact on the traditional Hindu business groups until 
1875.
57
 The first non Parsi to enter the industry in Bombay was Khatau Makanji, a Bhatia 
merchant from Gujarat.
58
 He was followed by many Hindu merchants. The majority of the 
Hindu mills in Bombay belonged to the Bhatia merchants. There were no Muslim 
entrepreneurs until the entry of Curimbhoy in 1888, who soon became one of the largest 
agents in the industry. David Sassoon, a Jewish entrepreneur, migrated to Bombay from 
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 Tripathi Historical Roots of Entrepreneurship, p109. 
55
 Guha, “More about Parsi Seths” 
56
 Mehta, Indian merchants and entrepreneurs in historical perspective, p196. 
57
Morris, The growth of large scale industries, 1982, p580-1 
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 Tripathi, Historical Roots of Entrepreneurship, p 108. 
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Baghdad and established himself in the opium trade.
 59
  He was a pioneer in his community. 
One of the main British companies was Greaves & Cotton. The company was set up in 
1863 by James Greaves who had been involved in the cotton trade in Gujarat and had 
extensive knowledge of the local markets. George Cotton was an agent of the East India 
Company and was involved in the cotton trade as well. Five spinning mills were set up in 
the next 20 years.
60
 The managing agent Greaves & Cotton and Bradbury & Brady were 
two British managing agents who controlled twelve out of fifteen British enterprises.
61
 
With the development of the railway lines, the internal trade in cotton, which had been 
dominated by Indian merchants, had become more accessible to the British companies.
62
  
The Indian merchants in eastern India traded in jute, rice and other agricultural 
commodities. The Marwaris as a group worked closely with British industrial and 
exporting firms, but did not enter industrial activity right up to the First World War. The 
Bengalis with western education entered into partnerships with the British in banking, 
insurance and shipping in the early decades of the 19
th
 century, but disappeared  after the 
middle of the 19
th
 century and the Marwaris emerged as the main brokers to the British 
companies. Timberg documents the rise of the Marwaris as industrial entrepreneurs from 
the futures market in opium, and specie to trade in raw jute and jute products in Calcutta. 
They began to speculate in the share market and bought shares in jute firms.
63
 Birla and 
Hukumchand started the first two Indian- owned jute mills in Calcutta, and this encouraged 
entry by several others from the community in the 1920s. 
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 Rutnagur, Bombay industries, p58. 
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 Greaves Cotton and Company: A century of Progress, Bombay 1959. 
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 Morris, , The growth of large scale industries , p580 
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The cotton textile industry provides the context to test the role of the social network 
as a determinant of entry. Five different communities, including the British were involved 
in this sector. The largest investment was shared by the Parsis and the Hindus. . The entry 
of different groups happened in clusters and is shown in figure 3. We use entry dates of 97 
firms between 1850 and 1915 to test if presence of community members in the industry led 
to further entry. Table 9 shows the pattern of entry in Bombay’s textile industry by social 
groups. Table 10 presents the probability of entry. The results show that cumulative 
presence of members of a community increased the probability of entry. Total number of 
firms in the industry also increased the probability of entry, but the effect was much 
smaller, confirming that social network effect mattered for decisions to enter. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that informational asymmetry explains the industrial divide between 
British and Indian business. Though geographical factors contributed to the location of tea, 
jute and coal in the hinterland of Calcutta and the cotton textile industry in Bombay, the 
involvement of British entrepreneurs and investors in the export oriented industries and 
their limited presence in the main import substituting industry is better explained by 
informational constraints rather than discrimination.  The paper argues that this divide 
reflects the nature of the two product markets, local versus international, and highlights the 
importance of informational constraints in determining flows of entrepreneurship and 
capital. The role of the social networks in information flows further accentuated the 
segregation by economic activity. 
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Table 1: Dominant Source of Capital and Entrepreneurship  by Industry 
(1914) 
INDUSTRY PRIMARY 
ENTREPRENEURS 
MAIN 
INVESTORS 
PRIMARY 
REGION 
TEA BRITISH 
 
BRITISH  IN 
BRITAIN 
CALCUTTA 
JUTE BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COAL BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
INDIAN INDIAN BOMBAY 
NO. OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES IN THE CITY AND HINTERLAND 
 CALCUTTA BOMBAY INDIA 
TEA 376 0 385 
JUTE 54 0 55 
COAL 225 5 232 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
18 178 227 
Source: Statistical Abstract of British India. 
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Table 2: Percentage shares of communities in enterprises: Bombay and Calcutta. 
BOMBAY: ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
1 
 
Year European Parsi Hindu Muslim Jewish 
1911 44 22 26 5 0 
1920 19 25 48 6 0 
BOMBAY: COTTON MILLS
2
 
1915 14 30 22 13 20 
1925 13 27 23 18 17 
CALCUTTA: 
1
 ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
Year European Bengali Marwari Parsi Muslim 
1875 66 03 0 3 1 
1890 66 12 2 2 2 
1911 55 29 5 2 1 
1920 42 36 10 5 1 
CALCUTTA: JUTE MILLS
3
 
1915 100 0 0 0 0 
1929 78 0 22 0 0 
Note: Shares in total number of enterprises. 
Source: 
1
Calculated from Bagchi, 1997, pp98 & 105   
2
Calculated from Rutnagar 1926, 
p54, 
2
 Calculated from Goswami, 1992, pp 99-100 &107 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Sterling and Rupee Investment in 1914-15 (£m) 
COMPANIES STERLING RUPEE TOTAL 
TEA 19.7   2.9 22.6 
COTTON 0.4 13.0 13.9 
JUTE 2.7 7.8 10.5 
GOLD 2.3 0.3 2.4 
COTTON&JUTE 
PRESS 
1.2 1.2 2.4 
TOTAL 27.4 29.0 56.9 
Source: Chapman(1992) based on Indian Industrial Commission, II, p854, p123. 
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Table 4: Average Paid-up Capital of Rupee Companies, Rupees ‘000 
 Cotton Tea  Jute Coal 
1881
a
 
 
688  
(28) 
244  
(113) 
958  
(8) 
649  
(6) 
1889
 b
 876 
(99) 
   
1891
a
 
 
852 
(57) 
253 1071 
(11) 
560 
(11) 
1900
 a
 
 
889 
(66) 
246 
(135) 
1444 
 (21) 
 411 
(34) 
1910
 c
 1575 
(43) 
339 
 
(87) 
3350 
(29) 
614 
(87) 
Source: 
a 
Based on
 Rungta’s industry level information,  
b 
Based on firm
 
level information from Bombay Millowners Association Report, 1889,
 
c
 Based on firm- level information from Investors’ India Year Book for 1911 
Note: figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms. 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Looms and Employment in Cotton and Jute Textiles 
Year No. of mills Average no. of loom 
equivalent/ looms per mill 
Average no. 
employed per mill 
Cotton    
1883-84 79 1043 60 
1893-94 142 1067 130 
1903-04 191 1121 185 
1913-14 271 1210 260 
Jute    
1883-84 23 267 2081 
1893-94 28 342 2471 
1903-04 38 484 3260 
1913-14 64 563 3379 
1926-27  554 3605 
1936-37  621 2765 
Source: Loom Equivalent for Cotton has been calculated using data from Morris 1982, 
p576 Jute is based on Morris 1982, p569, 615.  
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation.  
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Table 6: Average Machinery and Employment by Category of Owner, 1924 
 Number of 
firms 
Looms/Loom 
Equivalent 
 per firm 
Workers  
per firm 
Average 
capital-
labour ratio 
Cotton firms  
in Bombay 
67 2516   
Indian 55 2615* 1929 1.14 
British 12 2061* 1773 1.13 
Jute firms  
in Calcutta 
54 961   
Indian 8 823**   
British 46 985** 
(0.78) 
  
Notes: * T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 1.4 (not significant at 5% 
level). ** T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 0.8 (not significant at 5% 
level). 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mills’ Association Report for 1934, Investors India Year Book for 
1934, Jute Mills Review 1935 
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation. The regional average in table 5 is computed from the aggregate data. The group 
averages have been computed by regressing loom equivalent/loom on ownership, within 
each industry. 
 
TABLE 7: Capital-Labour Ratios by Community, Bombay Cotton Mills, 1924 
PARSI HINDU MUSLIM JEWISH EUROPEAN 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 
Source: Calculations based on Rutnagar, 1927, p55. 
 
 
Table 8: Profit Rate and Dividend across Sectors in 1910 
Sector Profit Rate (%) Ordinary Dividend (%) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Cotton 10 4 5 5 
Jute  12 10 5.5 5 
Tea 16 12 12 10 
Coal 4 0 6 0 
     
Source: Investors’ India Year Books 1911-1913 
Note: Profit Rate is calculated as a ratio of net profit and paid- up capital 
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Table 9: Bombay cotton mills: Number of Entrants, by Social group 
DECADE PARSI HINDU MUSLIM ENGLISH  JEWISH 
1850s 3 0 0 0 0 
1860s 5 2 0 0 0 
1870s 2 9 0 2 1 
1880s 9 5 1 9 2 
1890s 7 5 2 3 2 
1900s 2 0 1 1 0 
1910s 3 1 1 0 0 
Total 31 22 5 15 5 
Source: Calculations based on Rutnagur, Bombay Industries pp9-23. 
The difference in  
 
 
Table 10: Probability of Entry  
 
Dependent Variable: Entry  
 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
    
Cumulative 
Group 
Presence 
.73 (.07)**  0.54 (.10)** 
Total  Firms  0.13 (.03)** 0.14 (.04)** 
Social Group 
Effect 
Yes   Yes 
Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Log 
Likelihood 
-381.1 -386.5 -374.7 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mill’s Association Reports, Rungta, 1929, and Rutnagur 
Note: The model is estimated as an unbalanced panel Probit, Social groups are numbered as 
follows: 1. Parsi, 2.Hindu 3. English, 4. Jewish and 5. Muslim.   
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. Cumulative group presence is the total number 
of firms from the social group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: RUPEE INVESTMENT IN DIFFERENT SECTORS, 1880-1914 
 
Source: Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, p 296-29 for 1880-1900  
and  
FIGURE 2: ESTMATES OF INVESTMENT IN COTTON AND JUTE MILLS  
GROSS REAL INVESTMENT IN COTTON IN WESTERN INDIA AND JUTE IN BENGAL
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Source: Bagchi, Private Investment, pp 258, 273.  
Note: Gross investment is calculated by multiplying the real import value by the ratio of the 
block value of mills to the total value of plant and machinery in those mils. The figures are 
1.54 for cotton and 1.72 for jute. 
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Figure 3: Entry by Social Group 
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Note: Comm No. lists social groups 1. Parsi, 2. Hindu, 3. English, 4. Jewish and  
 5. Muslim 
 
